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Abstract. According to the perceptual symbols theory (Barsalou, 1999), sensorimotor simulations underlie the representation of concepts.
We investigated whether recognition memory for pictures of concepts was facilitated by earlier representation of visual properties of
those concepts. During study, concept names (e.g., apple) were presented in a property verification task with a visual property (e.g., shiny)
or with a nonvisual property (e.g., tart). Delayed picture recognition memory was better if the concept name had been presented with a
visual property than if it had been presented with a nonvisual property. These results indicate that modality-specific simulations are used
for concept representation.
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How do people represent the world in their memory? Re-
cently a number of theories have proposed that people use
sensorimotor processes for representing concepts and
events (Barsalou, 1999; Glenberg, 1997; Goldstone & Bar-
salou, 1998; Pulvermüller, 1999; Wilson, 2002; Zwaan,
2004). These theories propose that representations have
many similarities to actual experiences, and use the same
or highly similar processes. There is now quite a body of
data lending support to this embodied view of concept rep-
resentation (e.g., Borghi, Glenberg, & Kaschak, 2004; Pe-
cher, Zeelenberg, & Barsalou, 2003, 2004; Zwaan & Mad-
den, 2005; Zwaan, Stanfield, & Yaxley, 2002).
In his perceptual symbols theory, Barsalou (1999) pro-
vides a detailed account of how cognition is grounded in
sensorimotor systems. He proposes that the modality-specific
systems that are used for perception and action are also used
to represent concepts. During perception and action, the pat-
terns of activation that result from experiences are captured.
These form the basis for the perceptual symbols that are used
to reenact experiences. During thought a concept is represent-
ed by perceptual symbols through a simulation of sensorimo-
tor interaction with the concept. These simulations are partial
and sketchy, but nevertheless grounded in embodied experi-
ences. Because embodied experiences involve multiple mo-
dalities (vision, audition, touch, taste, smell, motor patterns,
and proprioception), symbols used in simulation may also be
from any modality of experience. However, selective atten-
tion often focuses a simulation on a single modality that is
relevant for the current context, rather than simulating all
aspects of experience for a given concept.
Pecher et al. (2003) obtained evidence for the selective
involvement of different perceptual modalities in conceptual
representations. In their study, concept names (e.g., apple)
were presented with a property name from a specific modal-
ity (e.g., green for visual, or tart for taste) in a property veri-
fication task. Pecher et al. found that switching the modality
between consecutive trials incurred a processing cost. Re-
sponses were faster and more accurate if a target trial (e.g.,
apple–green) was preceded by a trial from the same modality
(e.g., diamond–sparkle) than if it was preceded by a trial from
a different modality (e.g., airplane–noisy). Marques (2006)
recently replicated these results.
Modality-switch effects in conceptual tasks are explained
by assuming that a concept such as apple will be represented
mainly by a simulation in the modality that is relevant for a
specific context. Thus, if the task is to verify that an apple can
be green, a simulation of a visual experience with an apple
will be most relevant, whereas if the task is to verify that an
apple can be tart, a simulation of a taste experience with an
apple will be most relevant. Under these assumptions the
modality-switch effect is due to a cost that occurs if between
trials attention has to be switched from one modality-specific
system to another one. The study of Pecher et al. (2003) was
modeled after a study by Spence, Nicholls, and Driver (2001)
who obtained a modality-switch effect in perceptual tasks
(i.e., detecting the presence of a tone, light flash, or tactile
vibration). The finding of an analogous effect in conceptual
tasks, such as the property verification task, provides support
for the claim that perceptual systems are involved in concep-
tual representation.
The present study investigated the prediction that if con-
ceptual processing involves running a modality-specific
perceptual simulation, conceptual processing should influ-
ence performance in a subsequent task that uses nonverbal
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stimuli (i.e., pictures of objects). That is, the effects of Pe-
cher et al. (2003) should generalize to nonlinguistic stimuli.
This prediction follows from the perceptual symbols theory
(Barsalou, 1999). According to this theory, the processes
that are used to represent concepts overlap with those that
are used to perceive objects. For example, the processes
that are used to represent the color of an apple should over-
lap with the processes that are used to perceive the color of
an apple.
The degree of overlap between representation and per-
ception should also influence memory performance as is
predicted by the transfer-appropriate processing principle
(Durguno6lu & Roediger, 1987; Morris, Bransford, &
Franks, 1977). According to the transfer-appropriate pro-
cessing principle, performance is affected by the appropri-
ateness of acquisition activities for the kind of memory test.
Memory should be better if the same processes are per-
formed on materials during study and test than if different
processes are performed. In accordance with the transfer-
appropriate processing principle, a number of studies have
shown that recognition memory is better if the presentation
format at study overlaps with the presentation format at
test. For example, Kazmerski and Friedman (1997) showed
that recognition memory for items presented as words at
test was better for items studied as words than for items
studied as pictures, whereas recognition memory for items
presented as pictures at test was better for items studied as
pictures than for items studied as words.
In the present study we did not manipulate the presenta-
tion format of the concept, but rather the assumed repre-
sentation of the studied concepts. According to the percep-
tual symbols theory (Barsalou, 1999), the processes that are
used to represent concepts overlap with those that are used
to perceive objects. In particular, verifying a visual proper-
ty involves running a simulation of visual experiences. We
tested the hypothesis that memory for pictures of the con-
cepts presented in property verification would be better if
a visual property of the concept had been verified than if a
nonvisual property of the concept had been verified. For
example, verifying that an apple can be green should facil-
itate subsequent processing of the picture of an apple (i.e.,
not only the processing of the word apple in a conceptual
processing task). This is predicted because the visual sim-
ulation involved in verifying that an apple can be green
will not only involve the color of apples but also other vis-
ual aspects such as the shape of apples.
Evidence that visual representations are activated during
language comprehension was obtained by Zwaan and col-
leagues (2002). They showed that during sentence compre-
hension performance to pictures is facilitated if they match
the situation implied by the sentence (Stanfield & Zwaan,
2001; Zwaan & Madden, 2005; Zwaan et al., 2002). In the
present study we investigated the modality-specific nature
of representations. Rather than looking at performance dur-
ing online language processing, however, we investigated
the role of simulations on a delayed memory task. In a pre-
vious study we showed that retrieving knowledge about
concepts can be affected by the overlap in modality be-
tween study and test (Pecher et al., 2004). That study used
only words, however. The present study, therefore, presents
a stronger test of the perceptual symbols theory (Barsalou,
1999) because pictures (rather than words) were used in the
test task.
In the study phase of Experiment 1 we presented concept
names (not pictures) with either a visual property or a prop-
erty from another modality in a property verification task.
In the test phase of the experiment, black-and-white line
drawings of the concepts were presented in a recognition
memory task. Pictures were presented and subjects decided
whether the concept depicted in the picture had been pre-
sented earlier in the property verification task. We expected
that prior processing of visual properties would facilitate
picture recognition memory compared to prior processing
of nonvisual properties. Two blocks of property verifica-
tion and recognition memory tasks were presented to check
if strategic use of imagery played a role. If strategic use of
imagery during the study phase caused the modality effect
subjects would be more likely to use such a strategy during
the second study-test block than during the first study-test
block. Consequently, if a voluntary imagery strategy was
used a larger modality effect would be observed in the sec-
ond study-test block than in the first study-test block.
Experiment 1
Method
Participants
Thirty-two students at the Erasmus University participated
for course credit.
Materials
A set of 80 familiar concepts from different categories such
as animals, fruits, vegetables, and artifacts was created. For
each concept (e.g., apple), a visual property (e.g., green),
a property from a nonvisual modality (e.g., tart), and a
black-and-white line drawing of the concept were selected.
The line drawings were taken from Stanfield and Zwaan
(2001), Zwaan et al. (2002, http://freud.psy.fsu.edu/
~zwaanlab/studies/index.htm), and Bonin, Peereman, Ma-
lardier, Meot, and Chalard (2003, http://leadserv.u-bour-
gogne.fr/bases/pictures/), or were similar drawings found
on the internet. Neither of the two selected properties of a
concept was depicted in the line drawing. For the property
verification task sentences were created that combined the
name of the concept with the name of a property, for ex-
ample, An apple is green. All properties were correct (i.e.,
they were true for the concept).
Two counterbalanced versions were created so that each
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concept was combined with a visual property on one list
and a nonvisual property on the other list, and each list
contained 40 trials in each experimental condition. Half of
the concepts in each condition were presented in the first
block of the experiment, and the other half were presented
in the second block of the experiment. The assignment of
trials to blocks was counterbalanced across participants.
In addition, a practice set of 20 sentences and 8 pictures
and a filler set of 100 sentences and 80 pictures were cre-
ated. The practice sentences consisted of 10 correct con-
cept-property sentences and 10 false concept-property sen-
tences. The practice set of eight pictures contained black-
and-white drawings of four practiced concepts and four
new concepts. The filler sentences consisted of 10 correct
sentences and 90 false sentences. The false sentences had
properties from various modalities (e.g., visual, taste, audi-
tory) or associated, yet incorrect properties, such as A bed
can sleep.1 The correct filler sentences were similar to the
associated false sentences. The set of filler pictures con-
tained black-and-white drawings of 80 new (unstudied)
concepts that served as distractors in the recognition mem-
ory task. The filler concepts came from the same categories
as the experimental concepts. Each concept was used only
once in the experiment, except for the experimental con-
cepts which were presented once as a word in a property
verification trial and once as a picture in a recognition
memory trial.
Procedure
The experiment started with written instructions for the
property verification task. No mention was made of the
recognition memory test that would follow. The property
verification task started with a set of 20 practice trials, fol-
lowed by a block of 40 experimental (all of which were
true) and 50 filler (5 true and 45 false) trials presented in a
random order.
Each property verification trial started with the presen-
tation of a fixation point (*) for 500 ms on the computer
screen. The fixation point was immediately followed by a
sentence containing a concept name and a property. The
sentence was presented in the center of the screen and re-
mained visible until the participant responded. Participants
decided as quickly and accurately as possible whether a
property was true of the concept by pressing the m (true)
or z (false) key on the computer keyboard. If the response
was incorrect or slower than 2500 ms feedback “Fout” (er-
ror) or “Te langzaam” (too slow) was displayed for 600 ms.
After the response or feedback a blank screen was present-
ed for 300 ms before the next trial started.
After the first block of property verification trials written
instructions for the recognition memory task were present-
ed. The block of recognition memory pictures started with
4 practice pictures, followed by 40 experimental and 40
filler trials presented in a random order. Half of the trials
in each recognition memory block consisted of concepts
that had been studied (20 with visual properties and 20 with
nonvisual properties) and half of the trials consisted of con-
cepts that had not been studied (40 nonstudied fillers). Each
trial started with the presentation of a fixation point (*) for
250 ms on the computer screen. Immediately following the
fixation point, the picture was presented in the center of the
screen and remained visible until the participant responded.
Participants decided whether the concept depicted by the
picture had been presented in one of the property verifica-
tion sentences by pressing the m (old) or z (new) key on
the computer keyboard. Between trials a blank screen was
presented for 250 ms. Feedback on the percentage of cor-
rect responses was given at the end of a block of recogni-
tion trials. This feedback was given to motivate the subjects
and satisfy their curiosity.
After a short break the second block of property verifi-
cation trials was presented, followed by the second block
of recognition memory trials. This second block of memory
trials again started with four practice trials to control for
recency effects. Presentation of stimuli in the first or second
block was counterbalanced.
Results
The mean reaction times, hit rates (i.e., the percentage of
“old” responses to studied concepts) and d’ scores (a mea-
sure of sensitivity or memory strength, see MacMillan &
Creelman, 1991) in the recognition memory task are pre-
sented in Table 1. Reaction times for incorrect responses
and reaction times that were more than two standard devi-
ations from a participant’s mean reaction time for correct
responses were excluded from the analysis. This resulted
in removal of 16.6% of the data due to errors and 4.1% of
the data due to outlier reaction times.
A two (visual vs. nonvisual property condition) by two
(block 1 vs. block 2) repeated measures ANOVA was per-
formed on the mean reaction times. There was a main effect
of study modality, in which mean recognition reaction
times were faster for concepts that had been studied with a
visual property than for concepts that had been studied with
a nonvisual property, F(1, 31) = 13.51, p < .01. There was
Table 1. Mean recognition times, hit rates, and d’ scores
(SE) in Experiment 1
Property modality RT Hit rate d’
Visual 888 (17) 85.4 (2.2) 2.45 (0.13)
Nonvisual 926 (20) 81.3 (2.2) 2.26 (0.12)
Note. The false alarm rate (i.e., the percentage of “old” responses to
nonstudied concepts) was 12.9% (SE = 1.9) and the mean reaction
time for correct responses to nonstudied items was 874 ms (SE = 33).
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1 We included associated words in the false trials to promote deeper processing (Solomon & Barsalou, 2004).
no significant effect of block, F < 1, nor a significant inter-
action between block and modality, F(1, 31) = 1.00. If any-
thing, the effect of modality was smaller in the second
block (mean modality effect = 26 ms) than in the first block
(mean modality effect = 53 ms) of the experiment.
The ANOVA on hit rates revealed a similar pattern of
results. There was a main effect of modality, F(1, 31) =
10.92, p < .01, indicating that the percentage of errors was
lower for concepts that had been studied with a visual prop-
erty than for concepts that had been studied with a nonvis-
ual property. There was no significant block effect, nor a
significant interaction between block and modality, both
F values < 1. An ANOVA on the d’ scores confirmed that
recognition memory was better for the visual condition
than for the nonvisual condition. There was a main effect
of modality, F(1, 31) = 9.18, p < .01. There was no signif-
icant block effect, nor a significant interaction between
block and modality, both F values < 1.
In addition we analyzed the results of the study phase to
determine if there was difference in performance between
the visual and nonvisual conditions in the property verifi-
cation task. Only reaction times that were within two stand-
ard deviations of a subject’s mean were included in the
analysis. The mean trimmed reaction times were 1.071 ms
and 1.060 ms for trials with visual and nonvisual properties
respectively. The mean error percentages were 14.1% and
13.4% respectively. These means did not differ significant-
ly between conditions, both p values > .30.
Discussion
The results from the recognition test show that a picture of
a concept was recognized faster and with greater accuracy
if the name of the concept had been presented earlier in the
experiment with a visual property than if it had been pre-
sented with a property from a nonvisual modality. This mo-
dality effect was not likely the result of participant strate-
gies, because we did not find that the effect increased be-
tween blocks.
One interpretation of the present results is that the mo-
dality effect is due to more appropriate processing for the
picture memory test during study in the visual property
condition than during study in the nonvisual property con-
dition. In the visual property condition the perceptual sim-
ulation included aspects such as the shape of the concept.
Hence, the information stored in memory better matched
the picture presented in the recognition memory task than
if the concept had been presented in the nonvisual property
condition.
Another possible interpretation, however, is that recog-
nition memory was better in the visual property condition
than in the nonvisual property condition because presenta-
tion of the concept in the visual property condition for some
reason resulted in deeper or more elaborate encoding. The
analyses of performance in the property verification task
suggest that the latter interpretation is not valid because
performance did not differ between concepts presented
with visual properties and concepts presented with nonvis-
ual properties. However, to further rule out the enhanced
encoding explanation of the modality effect we performed
a second experiment. In Experiment 2 recognition memory
was tested by presenting concept names instead of pictures
during test. If the modality effect was due to deeper or more
elaborate encoding of the concepts presented with visual
properties than for concepts presented with nonvisual prop-
erties we should again obtain a modality effect. If, however,
the effect that we obtained in Experiment 1 was due to mo-
dality-specific representations at study, it should disappear
when we tested memory with concept names.
Experiment 2
Method
Participants
Thirty-two students at the Erasmus University participated
for course credit.
Materials and Procedure
The pictures that were used in the recognition memory test
of Experiment 1 were replaced by the names of the con-
cepts in the pictures. All other aspects of the present exper-
iment were identical to those of Experiment 1.
Results and Discussion
Mean reaction times and hit rates in the recognition mem-
ory task are presented in Table 2. Reaction times for incor-
rect responses and reaction times that were more than two
standard deviations from a participant’s mean reaction time
for correct responses were excluded from the analysis. This
resulted in removal of 12.8% of the data due to incorrect
responses and 4.6% of the data due to outlier reaction times.
A two (visual vs. nonvisual property condition) by two
(block) repeated measures ANOVA was performed on the
mean reaction times. There was a significant main effect of
block, F(1, 31) = 6.20, p < .05. Reaction times were faster
in the first block (M = 746) than in the second block (M =
783). The main effect of study modality failed to reach con-
Table 2. Mean recognition times, hit rates, and d’ scores
(SE) in Experiment 2
Property modality RT Hit rate d’
Visual 768 (17) 88.1 (1.7) 2.83 (0.09)
Nonvisual 757 (16) 86.3 (1.8) 2.75 (0.09)
Note. The false alarm rate was 7.2% (SE = 1.0) and the mean reaction
time for correct responses to nonstudied items was 810 ms (SE = 21).
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ventional levels of significance, F(1, 31) = 2.92, p = .10. If
anything, subjects were slower to recognize words that had
been presented with a visual property than words that had
been presented with a nonvisual property. This result con-
trasts with the advantage for the visual condition in Exper-
iment 1. There was no significant interaction between
block and modality, F(1, 31) = 1.38, p > .10.
The ANOVA on hit rates showed no main effect of study
modality, F(1, 31) = 1.48, p > .10. There was a significant
main effect of block, F(1, 31) = 11.7, p < .01, indicating
that hit rates were higher in the first block (M = .88) than
in the second block (M = .86) of the experiment. There was
no interaction between block and modality, F(1, 31) = 1.87,
p > .10. These findings were confirmed by an ANOVA on
the d’ scores. The analysis showed no main effect of study
modality, F(1, 31) = 1.64, p > .10. There was a significant
main effect of block, F(1, 31) = 4.87, p < .05, indicating
that performance was better in the first block (mean d’ =
2.92) than in the second block of the experiment (mean d’
= 2.67). There was no interaction between block and mo-
dality, F(1, 31) = 1.18, p > .10.
In order to see if Experiment 2 had enough power to
detect an effect we did a power analysis. The effect sizes
in Experiment 1 were .67 for reaction times, .57 for hit
rates, and .58 for d’s. The power to find a modality effect
was .88 for an effect size of .58, and .96 for an effect size
of .67, both two-tailed (G*Power, Erdfelder, Faul, & Buch-
ner, 1996). Hence, the absence of a modality effect in Ex-
periment 2 does not appear to be caused by a lack of power.
Somewhat unexpected, performance was better in the
first than in the second block of the experiment. One pos-
sible explanation for this difference is that during the sec-
ond block memory retrieval was negatively affected by the
stimuli studied in the first block (e.g., Criss & Shiffrin,
2004). Another explanation might be fatigue. It is not clear,
however, why a block effect was present in Experiment 2
but not in Experiment 1. Most important, however, the
main effect of block does not affect our main conclusion of
Experiment 2, which is that there was no effect of modality
when words rather than pictures were used in the test task.
General Discussion
Recognition memory for pictures was better if the concept
name had been presented with a visual property at study
than if the concept name had been presented with a non-
visual property at study. The effect was similar in the first
and second half of Experiment 1, and disappeared in Ex-
periment 2 when the concept names were used at test in-
stead of the pictures. The absence of an interaction effect
between modality and study-test block strongly suggests
that the advantage for concepts that had been presented
with a visual property was not due to subject strategies.
During the first block of property verification trials subjects
were unaware that their memory for the concept names
would be tested or that pictures of these concepts would be
presented. Therefore, it is unlikely that participants used a
strategy such as conscious imagery during the first block
of property verification trials to enhance their memory.
During the second block participants might have used such
a strategy, but nevertheless the modality effect did not in-
crease.
One possible explanation for the modality effect ob-
served in Experiment 1 is that visual properties for some
reason lead to better encoding at study. For example, the
visual properties may have been associated with larger or
richer knowledge structures in memory than nonvisual
properties, and consequently more elaborate memory trac-
es may have been formed for the concepts presented with
visual properties during study. However, if this explanation
was correct we should have observed a modality effect in
Experiment 2 in which memory was tested with words in-
stead of pictures. The absence of a modality effect in Ex-
periment 2 ruled out this alternative explanation of our re-
sults.
We conclude that the modality effect obtained in Exper-
iment 1 is the result of modality-specific processing of con-
cepts at study. Barsalou (1999) has proposed that in order
to represent concepts, our sensorimotor systems simulate
experiences with those concepts. The involvement of spe-
cific sensorimotor systems is context dependent. During
our property verification task participants simulated expe-
riences with the concepts in order to verify the properties.
When a visual property was presented, such as green in the
sentence An apple is green, they would simulate a visual
experience with an apple. During that simulation other vis-
ual properties of apple such as its shape were also repre-
sented. When a nonvisual property such as tart was pre-
sented, however, the visual system was not (or less) in-
volved in running the simulation. Therefore, visual
properties of apple were not included (or to a lesser extent)
in the representation of apple. When memory was subse-
quently tested with a black-and-white picture of an apple
there was a better match between the test stimulus and the
representation stored in memory for the visual property
condition than for the nonvisual property condition.
The present results provide an important extension to
those of Pecher et al. (2003). In their study, a modality-
switch effect was found between trials in a property verifi-
cation task, analogous to the modality-switch effect that
can be found in perceptual tasks (Spence et al., 2001). Pe-
cher et al. concluded that the conceptual system is ground-
ed in sensorimotor systems. In their study, however, only
conceptual trials consisting of verbal materials (i.e., con-
cept-property sentences) were presented. Moreover, the
modality-switch effect that they obtained was the result of
the trial immediately preceding the target trial. Thus, they
showed that sensorimotor information played a role during
online sentence processing. In the present study we tested
whether verifying properties of concepts resulted in the
storage of perceptual information in memory. The finding
that recognition memory for pictures was better if the con-
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cepts had been presented with visual properties during
study supports the idea that conceptual processing involves
perceptual simulation. In addition, it shows that a modali-
ty-specific representation was stored in memory.
Additional evidence for sensorimotor involvement
comes, for example, from studies in which participants read
or hear language, followed by the presentation of visual
information that matches or mismatches the perceptual ex-
perience that is implied but not actually described by the
language. For example, Zwaan et al. (2002) presented sen-
tences such as The eagle is in the sky or The eagle is in its
nest. In the first case the actual visual experience would be
of an eagle with its wings stretched out, and in the second
case it would be of an eagle with its wings folded in. A
picture of an eagle immediately followed the sentence, and
processing of the picture was facilitated if it matched the
shape implied by the preceding sentence. Other studies
have obtained similar effects for implied orientation (Rich-
ardson, Spivey, Barsalou, & McRae, 2003; Stanfield &
Zwaan, 2001), movement (Zwaan & Madden, 2005), and
action (Borghi, 2005; Borghi et al., 2004; Glenberg & Ka-
schak, 2002). This type of evidence is consistent with the-
ories that assume sensorimotor simulation of language ma-
terials and would not be predicted by amodal theories
(Stanfield & Zwaan, 2001).
In the present study we have extended these findings.
We have manipulated which modalities were involved in
conceptual representation. Our results show that this may
vary according to the context. In addition, our results show
that the effect of modalities has long-lasting effects on
memory. In previous studies the perceptual stimulus imme-
diately followed the sentence in which the concept was
named. These studies showed that sensorimotor informa-
tion was activated during online sentence processing.
Zwaan et al.’s results (and those of similar studies) show
that such representations match actual perceptual processes
or actions. The results from Pecher et al. (2003) show that
attention may focus selectively on a single modality. The
present study shows that sentence processing results in the
storage of a modality-specific representation. The finding
that these sensorimotor effects of language processing re-
main for longer time is new and of potential importance.
An even more convincing result might have been to find
better performance in a different modality condition for
stimuli in that modality, for example, sound or touch. Un-
fortunately, this is impossible with the present experimental
design. In Experiment 1 the visual properties that were used
in the property verification task were not perceivable in the
perceptual stimuli. For example, many of the properties
were color names, whereas black and white drawings were
used during the memory test. Thus, the information overlap
between study and test was the same in de visual and the
nonvisual condition. For other modalities, however, most
concepts do not have multiple properties that can be sepa-
rated perceptually. Hence, if we wanted to test other mo-
dalities we would need a different design.
A number of published studies have shown that various
memory measures are sensitive to the meaning context at
study for words (e.g., Anderson, Pichert, Goetz, Schallert,
Stevens, & Trollip, 1976; Barclay, Bransford, Franks, Mc-
Carrell, & Nitsch, 1974; Barsalou 1993; Zeelenberg, Pe-
cher, Shiffrin, & Raaijmakers, 2003). These studies did not
look at sensorimotor information, and used only words as
stimuli. Nevertheless, the context effects in these studies
may have been due to the involvement of different modal-
ities in the different context conditions used in the experi-
ments. The present results provide a possible mechanism
in the form of sensorimotor simulations for these previous
findings.
Thus, the present results provide further support for the
view that sensorimotor systems are involved in language
comprehension. As people are giving meaning to language
materials, they form mental representations using percep-
tual symbols (Barsalou, 1999). The present study shows
that these representations are simulations that match actual
perceptions, providing evidence that the same systems are
used for perception and conceptual representation. The pre-
sent study also shows that earlier representations can affect
later processing of the same concepts.
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